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I.

INTRODUCTION

High school students in the Future Independent School District
were the first in a sweeping trend around the nation to undergo random, suspicionless drug testing prior to beginning classes. This testing
will continue at random intervals throughout the school year. Unlike
previous drug testing programs in public schools, this program is not
limited to competitive athletes or extracurricular participants: it covers the entire student body. For example, Sarah Student, an ordinary
freshman, makes good grades and never gets into trouble. She is quite
terrified by the prospect of having to urinate while her teacher listens,
and then hand over a cup filled with her urine to her teacher. After
all, she does not use drugs and has done nothing to warrant such an
embarrassment. Her parents, Paul and Pam, are outraged at the
thought of their daughter having to undergo such an intrusive procedure. Drug testing was certainly not part of the educational experience that they had in mind for Sarah. Paul and Pam are prepared to
fight for the right that they never even knew they had lost: the right to
raise their daughter.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the hypothetical case of the
Future Independent School District, but its history of diluting the
Fourth Amendment rights of students foreshadows an acceptance of
such an all-encompassing program. In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,1 the
Court recently allowed expansion of drug testing to include students
who had no history of drug use and who were not susceptible to increased physical danger like that faced by athletes. 2 The same standard used by the Court in Pottawatomie could easily be used to
approve the broad drug testing program of the Future Independent
School District.'
In 1969, the Court stood firmly behind the constitutional rights of
students: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse gate."4 By 1995,
1. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
2. See id. at 837-38.
3. See infra Part IV.B.1.
4. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). This
language was referenced by the Supreme Court in the recent decision of Board of
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the Court's stance had greatly changed. In that year, the Court
handed down Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,5 which upheld a
school district's random, suspicionless drug testing of students involved in interscholastic athletics.6 Continuing this trend in Pottawatomie, the Court upheld an Oklahoma school district's practice of
random, suspicionless drug testing of all students involved in extracurricular activities:7 a practice that forces students to shed their constitutional freedoms in order to engage in activities that many consider an
essential part of the educational experience. 8 As these two cases illustrate, the next logical evolution will be to expand random, suspicionless drug testing to all students. In Pottawatomie, the Court
abandoned the factually-based test used in Vernonia.9 In Vernonia, a
severe drug problem existed among the students, and drug use would
have greatly increased the risk of injury to student athletes.' ° In Pottawatomie, no drug problem existed among the students involved in
extracurricular activities, and there was no increased risk of injury to
those students. 1
This Note argues that the Court should return to the fact-specific
balancing test utilized in Vernonia and close the door to the further
expansion of suspicionless drug testing in public schools. Part II of
this Note will discuss the steady erosion of Fourth Amendment protections in the school context, as well as the expansion of drug testing
outside the school setting. Part III will discuss the factual and procedural background of Pottawatomie and will focus on the Supreme
Court's analysis and the dissent's application of the Vernonia standard
to Pottawatomie'sfacts. Part IV will explore the problems and ramifications of the Pottawatomie decision. Part V will offer recommendations for what the Court should do in the future to protect the Fourth
Amendment rights of students and prevent the further expansion of
drug testing in schools. Part VI will summarize and conclude.
II.

THE EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
2
PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS'

A.

TraditionalProtections of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides:
Educationof Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536

U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
5. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
6. See id. at 650, 665.
7. Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 824-26.
8. See id. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9. Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
10. See id. at 648-49.
11. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 835-36.
12. Although beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth noting that the erosion of
the Fourth Amendment extends into various other contexts. For a discussion of the
erosion of the Fourth Amendment in other areas, see generally Nancy J. Kloster,
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the reasonableness requirement' 4 of the Fourth Amendment has focused on three areas: warrants, probable cause, and individualized suspicion. 5 Generally, a
warrant 1 6 is required to conduct a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment;1 7 warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, save
only for specific exceptions. 8 Although some form of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing is usually required, the Fourth Amendment
itself does not impose such a requirement. 9 Full-scale searches are
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment on a showing of probable cause 20 "to believe that a crime has been committed
and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be
searched."'" Searches or seizures that are less than full-scale may be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even without probable
cause or a warrant, if they comply with a balancing test that gives due
regard to the privacy interests that will be invaded. 2 In order to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in such a case,
the Court will balance the invasion which the search encompasses
against the need to search.2 3
Note, An Analysis of the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Regarding
Voluntary Third Party Consent Searches: The Defendant's Perspective,72 N.D. L. REV.
99 (1996); Nicole J. Lehmann, Note, The "Plain Feel" Exception in Minnesota v.
Dickerson: A Further Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257
(1994); Julie A. Line, Note, Fourth Amendment-Further Erosion of the Warrant
Requirement for UnreasonableSearches and Seizures: The Warrantless Trash Search
Exception, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1988).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. The Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures; it forbids only unreasonable ones. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
15. See generally Mary Kim, Investigation and Police Practices: Overview of the
Fourth Amendment, 90 GEO. L.J. 1099 (2002) (discussing reasonableness requirement
under the Fourth Amendment).
16. Warrants must specify with particularity the persons or things to be seized.
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
18. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
19. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
20. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354-55. "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (alteration in original) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
21. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.

523, 536-37 (1967)).
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The "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement is one
such case in which a balancing test is employed to determine the reasonableness of the search: 24 "On one side of the balance are arrayed
the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal
with breaches of public order. ' 25 The "special needs" exception was
first developed by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in New
27
Jersey v. T.L.O. 2 6 "Special needs" exist in the public school setting,
as well as in other contexts.28
B.

The Traditional Protections of the Fourth Amendment
Eradicatedfrom the School Setting

1. T.L.O.: Students Kiss Warrants and Probable Cause Good-bye
In T.L.O., a high school freshman, T.L.O., was caught smoking in
the bathroom by her teacher. 29 T.L.O. was taken to the vice principal's office, where he searched her purse and found marijuana paraphernalia, as well as other items that implicated her in the sale of
marijuana. 3° The State used the information to prosecute T.L.O. for
delinquency.3 ' The sole issue in this case was the admissibility of the
evidence found in her purse.32
The Supreme Court held that the warrant and probable cause requirements that normally apply under the Fourth Amendment were
unnecessary in a public school setting.33 Reasonableness, the Court
stated, was the fundamental inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.34
The Court looked to Terry v. Ohio3 5 for its analysis of the reasonable24. See Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence:Amending the
Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 259 (2000). See generally Gerald S.
Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of
Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1992); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special
Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the WarrantPreference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997).
25. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
26. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See infra Part II.B.1 (providing a
detailed discussion of TL.O.).
27. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
28. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). See infra Part
II.C.1-2 (providing an in-depth discussion of these cases).
29. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
30. Id.
31. "'[D]elinquency' means the commission of an act by a juvenile which if committed by an adult would constitute: a. A crime; b. A disorderly persons offense or
petty disorderly persons offense; or c. A violation of any other penal statute, ordinance or regulation." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-23 (West 1987).
32. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
33. Id. at 340-41. The Court also held that school officials qualified as state actors
and were subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 336.
34. Id. at 340.
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ness of the search. Under Terry, the inquiry is twofold: (1) "whether
the . . .action was justified at its inception" 36 and (2) "whether the
search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' 3 7
According to the T.L. 0. Court, the first prong is satisfied when reasonable grounds exist to believe that the search will reveal evidence
that the student either has violated or is violating the rules of the
school or the law.3 8 The second prong is satisfied if the search is limited in scope to measures that are reasonably related to the goals of
the search and not overly intrusive when taking into consideration the
nature of the infraction, the student's age, and the student's sex.39
The Court retained the requirement of individualized suspicion in
T.L.O. but made clear that individualized suspicion, like the warrant
and probable cause requirements, was not required in all cases.4n
Thus, in one fell swoop, the Court removed the Fourth Amendment
protections of a warrant and probable cause from students and hinted
that the last remaining protection of individualized suspicion would
soon fall. 4 '
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in T.L.O. emphasized that
"special needs '42 in the elementary and secondary school setting were
crucial to the Court's judgment. 43 Justice Blackmun wrote that "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
Thus,
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."'
T.L. 0. gave birth to the "special needs" exception to the general requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and this exception would ben5
come the basis for upholding the drug testing policies in Vernonia
and Pottawatomie.4 6
2.

Vernonia: Students Bid Farewell to Individualized Suspicion

In Vernonia, school administrators were confronted with a large increase in disciplinary problems among students involved in interscho36. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
37. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
38. Id. at 341-42.
39. Id. at 342.
40. Id. at 342 n.8.
41. See id. at 340-41, 342 n.8.
42. See generally Jennifer E. Smiley, Comment, Rethinking the "Special Needs"
Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Students and the Narrowing of
Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 811 (2001) (discussing the evolution of "special needs" jurisprudence).
43. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 665 (1995).
46. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
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lastic athletics.4" Strong evidence existed of drug and alcohol abuse
among student athletes, and they were believed to be the leaders of

the drug culture.48 In response to these problems, the school district
implemented a policy of random, suspicionless drug testing for students involved in interscholastic athletics.4 9

50
The Court upheld Vernonia's suspicionless drug testing policy.

Writing for the six-to-three majority, Justice Scalia relied on Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in T.L.O. 51 that "special needs" exist in the
public school setting:52 "the warrant requirement 'would unduly in-

terfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures [that are] needed,' and 'strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause' would undercut 'the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.' ' 3 As the Court had foreshadowed in
T.L. 0.,4 the Vernonia case provided the perfect vehicle to eliminate
the protection of individualized suspicion.
After stating that urine collection and drug testing constituted a
"search" subject to the Fourth Amendment,5 5 the Vernonia Court conducted a fact-specific balancing 6 of the nature of the privacy interest
and the characterof the intrusion against the nature and immediacy of
the governmental concern and the efficacy of the means used to meet
it.57 Central to the Court's holding was the observation that "children

• . . have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as
schoolmaster ' 58 and schools act in loco parentis59 over children in
their care. 60
With respect to the nature of the privacy interest, the Court found
that students who participate in school athletics have subjected them-

47. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63 (citing Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796
F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated by 515
U.S. 646 (1995)).
48. See id. (citing Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).
49. See id. at 649-50.
50. See id. at 665. For a further discussion of this case, see Charles Neil Floyd,
Note, Searches in the Absence of Individualized Suspicion: The Case of Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, 50 ARK. L. REV. 335, 335-40, 349-62 (1997).
51. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
52. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (alteration in original) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
340-41).
54. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
55. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.
56. See id. at 664-65.
57. See id. at 654-61.
58. Id. at 654.
59. In loco parentis means "[a]cting as a temporary guardian of a child." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999). For an in-depth discussion of the doctrine of in
loco parentis, see generally Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's
Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002

BYU

EDUC.

& L.J. 17 (2002).

60. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

7

TEXAS
LAW
REVIEW
Texas
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.
10 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 13

[Vol. 10

selves to privacy intrusions because they engage in communal undress,
submit to vaccinations and medical examinations, and voluntarily
choose to participate. 6 ' In addition, the Court found that the invasion
of privacy was insignificant because the urine sample was produced in
a setting similar to that of public restrooms; the tests only detect drugs
and not health problems; the results are disclosed only to limited personnel; and students need not reveal prescription medications to
school officials.6 2 On this side of the scale, the Court found that the
students were subjected to a minimal invasion of privacy in a realm in
which they already had a diminished expectation of privacy.
On the other side of the scale, the Court found the governmental
concern-drug use by schoolchildren-a compelling interest.6 3 The
Court relied on the district court's conclusion that "'a large segment
of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion,' that '[d]isciplinary actions had
reached 'epidemic proportions,"'and that 'the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's mispercep64 In addition,
tions about the drug culture.' ,,
the Court emphasized
the narrow tailoring of the program to athletes, where the risk of
physical harm to drug users and their fellow participants was extremely high.6 5
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion stressed that the holding was
limited to students who participate in interscholastic athletics, in large
part based upon the risks of physical harm inherent in athletics.6 6
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion focused on the history of the
Fourth Amendment and its accompanying protections from its inception to the present. 67 According to Justice O'Connor, the Framers of
the Constitution enacted the Fourth Amendment to protect against
general, blanket searches.6 8 Justice O'Connor found it unacceptable
that students had been "deprived of the Fourth Amendment's only
remaining, and most basic, categorical protection: its strong preference for an individualized suspicion requirement, with its accompanying antipathy toward personally intrusive, blanket searches of mostly
innocent people. '69 After the Vernonia7 ° decision was delivered, the
61. Id. at 656-57.
62. See id. at 658, 660.
63. Id. at 661.
64. Id. at 662-63 (emphasis added) (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796
F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated by 515
U.S. 646 (1995)).
65. Id. at 662. The Court also found that suspicion-based testing would be worse
than suspicionless testing and that the least intrusive search need not be used. Id. at
663-64.
66. Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
67. See id. at 667-76 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
68. Id. at 669-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 681 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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student's basic Fourth Amendment protections-the need for warrants, probable cause, and individualized suspicion-were eradicated.
C.

Drug Testing Outside the School Setting

After the "special needs" doctrine came into existence, the Court
expanded its application to other contexts. The Court found "special
needs" to exist among railroad 7 ' and customs employees.7 2 The Court
looks to the entirety of its "special needs" jurisprudence when analyzing "special needs" cases.7 3 For this reason, it is important to understand the Supreme Court's approach to the "special needs" analysis in
these areas.
1. Skinner: Documented Drug Use and the Risk of Mass Fatalities
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 4 the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgated regulations providing for
mandatory drug testing of employees after a "major train accident," 7 5
an "impact accident," 7 6 or any incident involving the death of an onduty employee.7 7 Various labor organizations filed suit to enjoin these
regulations.78 In response, the FRA presented specific evidence of
nearly two dozen train accidents, involving alcohol or drug use, from
1972 to 1983,79 accidents that resulted in nineteen million dollars in
damage, sixty-one injuries, and twenty-five fatalities. 80 Also, seventeen on-duty employees suffered injuries resulting in death from accidents in which alcohol or drug use was a contributing factor.8 1
According to the Court, this evidence demonstrated that drug
use by
''
railroad employees could easily result in "great human lOSS. 82
The existence of "special needs" in the railroad industry was key to
the reasonableness of the suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees. 83 Due to the finding of "special needs," the Court applied
the reasonableness balancing test: the intrusion on the person's Fourth
Amendment interests versus the promotion of legitimate governmen71. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
72. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
73. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 passim (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. passim.
74. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
75. Id. at 609. A major train accident means any train accident that involves "(i) a
fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a
reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more." Id.
76. Id. An impact accident means a collision that results in damage to railroad
property of $50,000 or more, or results in a reportable injury. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 612.
79. Id. at 607.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 628-29.
83. See id. at 619-20.
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tal interests.8 4 The Court found that the employees had a diminished
expectation of privacy because the railroad industry was so highly regulated," and the government's interest outweighed the employees'
minimal expectations of privacy.8 6 Railroad employees performed
safety-sensitive tasks8 7 similar to employees in nuclear power facilities: they "discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others
that ... can have disastrous consequences." 88 The risk of high human
casualties in this case justified the removal of the Fourth Amendment
requirements of a warrant, probable cause, and individualized
suspicion. 89
2.

Von Raab: Direct Contact with Drugs and the Risk of
National Security Breaches

In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,9° the United
States Customs Service (USCS) implemented a drug testing program 91 for employees in any one of three positions: those involved in
drug interdiction, carrying firearms, or handling classified material.9 2
A union of federal employees filed suit against the Customs Commissioner, claiming the testing was a violation of their constitutional
rights. 93 The Customs Commissioner argued that the program was
necessary because Customs employees have direct contact with drugs,
carry firearms, and are exposed to threats of large criminal syndicates, 94 and the Commissioner presented specific evidence that nine
officers had been killed in the last decade and over sixty employees
had been arrested for criminal and integrity violations from 1985 to
1987.15 According to the Court, the USCS was the "first line of defense" in protecting the public from drug trafficking across the
borders.96
Applying the same analysis as that used in Skinner,97 the Court
found that "special needs" existed in the USCS, and therefore, once
again, balanced the individual's privacy expectations against the government's asserted interests.9 8 The Court held that Customs employ84. Id. at 619.
85. See id. at 627-28.
86. Id. at 633.
87. Id. at 630.
88. Id. at 628.
89. See id. at 623-33.
90. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). This was a companion case to Skinner. See id. at 665.
91. Id. at 660. The USCS established a Drug Screening Task Force that concluded
drug screening was a reliable and viable option. Id.
92. Id.at 660-61.
93. Id. at 663.
94. Id. at 660-61.
95. See id. at 669-70.
96. See id. at 668.
97. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622-33 (1989).
98. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
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ees have a diminished expectation of privacy due to the nature of their
work. 99 In contrast, the government's interest in ensuring the fitness
and integrity of Customs employees was found to be compelling10 0
due to the "extraordinary safety and national security hazards" attendant with protecting America's borders.'
The risk of national security breaches in this case justified the removal of the Fourth
Amendment requirements of a warrant, probable cause, and individualized suspicion."'
3.

Chandler: The Absence of Established Drug Use and the
Absence of Risk

In Chandler v. Miller,'1 3 the State of Georgia enacted a statute requiring candidates for certain state offices to pass a drug test in order
to qualify for a place on the ballot. 1 Libertarian Party nominees
filed suit against state officials contesting the statute.10 5 The legislature did not claim that it had enacted the statute in response to any
suspicion or fear of drug use among state officials; no evidence of drug
use or endangerment of public safety was presented. 10 6 Rather, the
statute was enacted to deter drug users from seeking office. 0 7
The Supreme Court stated that the guiding framework was the
Fourth Amendment analysis for suspicionless drug testing used two
years prior in Vernonia,' °s as well as the analysis used in Skinner10 9
and Von Raab. 1 ° The Court rejected the idea that preventive drug
testing in this context presented a "special need";
the need was
merely symbolic and did not qualify as a "special need."" 2 In holding
the drug testing program unconstitutional," 3 the Court relied heavily
on the fact that no evidence existed of drug abuse by elected offi99. Id. at 672.
100. Id. at 670.
101. Id. at 674.
102. See id. at 679. The Court vacated and remanded the part of the judgment
which upheld drug testing for employees who handle confidential information. Id. at
664-65.
103. 520 U.S. 305 (1997). For a further discussion of this case, see Joy L. Ames,
Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special Needs" for Suspicionless Drug Testing
Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REV. 273 (1997).
104. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
105. Id. at 310.
106. See id. at 319, 321-23.
107. Id. at 318.
108. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
109. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
110. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
111. See id. at 322; id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 322.
113. Id. at 309. Justice Ginsburg, who dissented in Pottawatomie and concurred in
Vernonia, authored the majority opinion in Chandler. See id. at 308; Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 842 (2002);
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 666.
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cials.11 4 When the Court discussed Skinner,1 5 the focus was on
human casualties and safety hazards;1 16 when the Court discussed Von
Raab," 7 the focus was on the unique role of the Customs Service in
defending the nation against drugs;" 8 when the Court discussed
Vernonia,119 the focus was on the drug crisis led by athletes who were
placed at greater risk of injury because of their drug use.12 0 The
Court's decision in Chandler hinged on the fact that state officials did
not perform safety-sensitive
tasks and, therefore, the public safety was
21
not in jeopardy.1
III.

THE ROAD TRAVELED IN POTTAWATOMIE

A.

Factual Background of Pottawatomie

On September 14, 1998,122 the school board in rural Tecumseh,
Oklahoma
adopted the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (Policy).' 23 The Policy required all middle and high school students who
participated in extracurricular activities to submit to suspicionless
drug testing. 1 24 The original draft covered only students participating
in athletic competition, but the Policy was later amended to cover students in all extracurricular activities, 25 including Academic Team, Future Homemakers of America (FHA), Future Farmers of America
(FFA), band and choir, as well as cheerleading and athletics. 26 Although the Policy provided for testing of students in all extracurricular
activities, the school district chose to apply the terms of the Policy
27
only to students engaging in activities of a competitive nature.
The Policy required that each student and the student's parent or
guardian sign and return a form agreeing to submit to drug testing. 28
The tests could be administered on three occasions: (1) prior to participating in an extracurricular activity, (2) on a random basis while participating in an extracurricular activity, and (3) at any time, while
114. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 311, 318-19, 321-22.
115. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
116. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314-15.
117. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
118. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 316.
119. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
120. See Chandler,520 U.S. at 316-17.
121. See id. at 321-23.
122. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1282
(W.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
123. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 826 (2002).
124. Id.
125. Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 n.2.
126. Id. at 1282.
127. Id. at 1282-83. In addition, an annual fee of four dollars was charged to each
student that was required to participate in the drug testing program. Id. at 1283.
128. See Brief of Petitioners, 2001 WL 1819195 at *10, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332).
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competing, based upon reasonable suspicion. 2 9 The tests would detect cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines,
and cannabinoid metabolites (marijuana). 3 ' On the basis of reasonable suspicion, students could be tested for
substances other than these,
31
such as anabolic steroids and alcohol.'
When selected, a student provided a urine sample for drug testing.132 A faculty member called a student out of class and monitored
the student's urine production in the restroom.1 33 Male and female
students produced the urine samples in a closed bathroom stall while a
monitor of the same sex waited outside the stall' 34 and listened for
normal urination sounds.'3 5 The monitor poured the urine sample
into two bottles and, along with the student, sealed the bottles. 136 The
bottles were then placed into a mailing pouch, along with a consent
form signed by the student. 37 The monitor also provided the student
with a form on which the student could list any prescription medications taken in the last thirty days.' 38 The form was submitted to the
lab in a sealed envelope, and neither the monitor
nor any other em39
ployee of the school district could examine it.'
The Policy required that test results remain confidential and be provided to school personnel only on a "need to know" basis.' 4 ° The first
time a student tested positive for drugs, the school would notify the
student's parent or guardian. 41 The student could continue participating in extracurricular activities if the student submitted proof of
participation in drug counseling within five days of the meeting and
agreed to another drug test in two weeks. 142 The second time a student tested positive, the student would be (1) suspended from participation in extracurricular activities for fourteen days, (2) required to
submit to monthly drug tests, and (3) required to complete drug counseling.1 4 3 The third time a student tested positive, the student would
be suspended from participation in extracurricular activities for the
longer of either eighty-eight school days or the remainder of the
129. Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1283 n.3.
132. See id. at 1290-91.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1290 n.35; Brief of Petitioners, 2001 WL 1819195 at *37, Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No.
01-332).
135. Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 n.35.
136. Id. at 1291.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1294.
139. Id.
140. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 833-34.
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school year.' 44 At no point would academic disciplinary action be
taken, 4 5 and the
results were not to be turned over to law enforce146
ment officials.
B.

ProceduralBackground of Pottawatomie

Lindsey Earls,1 4 7 a student at Tecumseh High School, sued the
Board of Education of Tecumseh Public School District and Tecumseh
Public Schools for declaratory and injunctive relief after enactment of
the Policy.1 48 Ms. Earls was a member of the academic team, show
choir, and marching band. 149 She and her parents challenged the portions of the Policy that required suspicionless drug testing of students
in non-athletic extracurricular activities.1 5 ° They
did not challenge the
1 51
portions of the Policy that applied to athletes.
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found the
Policy's search procedure reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
and granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education. 5 '
After finding the existence of a "special need,' 53 the court applied
the same balancing test used in Vernonia154 The court interpreted
Vernonia as holding that the most significant element in the analysis
was the fact that the Policy applied to students attending public
school, not the fact that it was limited only to students participating in
athletics. 155 The court found the voluntary nature of athletics and extracurricular activities equivalent in that they both result in a diminished expectation of privacy. 56 Additionally, the court found that the
character of the intrusion was insignificant, as in Vernonia,157 because
the Policy's testing procedure respected student confidentiality more
than the policy had in Vernonia.158 The court determined that the Pol144. Id. at 834.
145. Id. at 833.
146. Id.
147. Daniel James, another student of Tecumseh High School, also joined in the
suit as a plaintiff. However, he became otherwise ineligible to participate in extracurricular activities because he no longer satisfied the academic requirements, so the
Court focused its discussion on Ms. Earls. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub.
Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1282 & n.1 (W.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264
(10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
148. See id. at 1282.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1283.
151. Id. at 1283 n.6.
152. Id. at 1296.
153. Id. at 1288.
154. See id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995)).
155. Id. at 1289 n.31.
156. Id. at 1289.
157. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
158. Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95. In Vernonia, students were required to disclose any prescription medications which they were taking to the teacher who monitored their urine sample. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 659. The Court was troubled by
this breach of confidentiality and suggested that the information be sent in a sealed
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icy was sound by interpreting Vernonia so as not to require the school
district to focus on the students who are using drugs or are most likely
to use drugs;"5 9 it made no difference that testing extracurricular par16 °
ticipants would cover the "vast majority" of the student population.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Vernonia decision
quite differently. 6 In the Tenth Circuit's view, the most significant
element to be considered in the analysis was the Court's emphasis and
reliance on the existence of a drug problem among those students
tested.1 62 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Supreme Court emphasized the school's role as guardian and tutor, but
found that the Court also emphasized the serious need for the testing
that the Vernonia situation presented.1 63 In comparison, drug use in
years had
Tecumseh schools was minimal:1 64 the schools 1in
65 previous
problem.
major
a
not
were
drugs
that
reported
In applying the balancing test, the court found that students in extracurricular activities, like athletes, have a diminished privacy interest. 6 6 The court based that conclusion not on the voluntary nature of
67
the activity, but on the increased rules accompanying participation.
The court also agreed that the character of the intrusion was insignificant.' 68 One factor-the lack of a governmental concern and the ineffectiveness of the testing-tipped the balance, however, in favor of the
students. The court stated: "[W]e see little efficacy in a drug testing
policy which tests students among whom there is no measurable drug
problem. ' 169 In order for a drug testing policy to be reasonable, and
thus constitutional, the court stressed that a school district must
demonstrate a documented drug problem among a significant number
of those students subject to the testing:17710 only then would drug testing actually remedy the drug problem.1
72
These divergent interpretations of Vernonia would soon be resolved by the Supreme Court's abandonment of the fact-specific test
upon which the Tenth Circuit relied.
envelope to the testing lab. Id. at 660. Tecumseh's Policy incorporated this suggested
level of confidentiality. Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d. at 1294.
159. See id. at 1295.
160. See id. at 1282.
161. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir.
2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
162. Id. at 1271 n.5.
163. Id. at 1268, 1272.
164. Id. at 1272.
165. Id. at 1274.
166. Id. at 1276.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1277 (alteration in original).
170. Id. at 1278.
171. Id.
172. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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The Supreme Court's Analysis in Pottawatomie:
Vernonia's Balancing Test
1. Majority

The Supreme Court held in Pottawatomie that the Policy was reasonable and constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 173 After
discussing the existence of "special needs" in the public school setting, 174 Justice Thomas, writing for the five-to-four majority, stated
that the Vernonia balancing test was the controlling analytical framework. 75 The Court's analysis on the first part of the balancing testthe nature of the privacy interest and the character of the intrusionwas in line with the facts and reasoning in Vernonia.1 76 The Court's
analysis of the governmental interests diverged from Vernonia, however, because none of the concerns present in the Vernonia schools
were present in the Tecumseh schools.' 7 7 The Pottawatomie Court reiterated that the school's status as guardian and tutor was crucial to
upholding the drug testing policy:178 "[W]hen the government acts as
guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one
1 79
that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake.'
a.

The Nature of the Privacy Interest and the
Characterof the Intrusion

Like athletes, students who participated in extracurricular activities
voluntarily subjected themselves to additional rules and requirements
that further diminished their expectation of privacy.' 80 Also, students
were regularly subjected to vaccinations and physical examinations.'
These factors discussed in Vernonia were also present in
18 2
Pottawatomie.

According to Justice Thomas, the method used to collect the urine
samples determined the character of the intrusion on Earls' privacy.' 8 3
The Court found the Policy's method to be basically identical to the
one approved in Vernonia,'8 4 but even less intrusive because both
male and female students produced their samples behind a closed
stall.185 The results remained mostly confidential' 8 6 and were not
173. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 837 (2002).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 827.
See id. at 829.
Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-60, with Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 829.
See infra Part III.C.l.a-b.
Pottawatomie,536 U.S. at 830-31 & n.3.
Id. at 830 (alteration in original) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
Id. at 831.
See id. at 830-31.
Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57, with Pottawatomie,536 U.S. at 830-31.
Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 832.

184. Id.
185. See id. at 832-33.
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used for academic discipline or law enforcement purposes. 8 7 Thus,
the Court determined that the character of the intrusion in this case
was minimal.' 8 8 Again, the Court's reasoning paralleled its decision in
Vernonia.'89
b.

The Nature and Immediacy of the Government's Concerns and
the Efficacy of the Means Used in Meeting Them

The Court found that the health and safety concerns present in
Vernonia were also present in Pottawatomie.'9° Although Tecumseh
presented very little evidence of a drug problem, the Court stated:
"[T]he nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a press1 92
ing concern in every school."'' The Court discussed earlier cases
to illustrate that a demonstrated drug problem was not required to
find a testing program reasonable' 93 and that drug testing could be
valid when used for a solely preventative reason. 194 The Court found
the Tenth Circuit's required showing of a drug problem to be impracticable: designating a threshold level of drug use sufficient to qualify as
a drug problem would be impossible. 95
Justice Thomas noted that safety risks for students in extracurricular activities differed from the risks of students in athletics, but as96
serted that drug testing furthers the safety interest of all students.1
The Court acknowledged that there was a closer fit between the drug
testing in Vernonia and drug use by student athletes, but stressed this
did not mean that Vernonia required schools to test only those students most likely to use drugs. 197 Ultimately, the Court found that
Tecumseh's Policy effectively served the school's interest in protecting
the health and safety of its students.' 98 The Court thus abandoned
Vernonia's fact-specific test by (1) allowing national data to replace
school-specific threshold information so that students among whom
there was no drug problem could be tested and (2) allowing the general risk of overdose to replace the specific risks of physical harm
faced by athletes utilizing drugs.1 99
186. Id. at 833.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 834.
189. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658-60 (1995).
190. Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 834.
191. See id. (alteration in original).
192. Id. at 835 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 673 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989)).
193. Id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
194. Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673).
195. Id. at 836.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 837-38.
198. Id. at 838.
199. See id. at 834.
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Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion

Justice Breyer's concurrence emphasized four points about Tecumseh's need for the drug testing program: (1) the severity of the drug
problem in schools generally, (2) the fact that supply-side interdiction
had failed to reduce teenage drug use, (3) the need for public schools
to find an effective way to deal with the drug problem, and (4) the
effect that policies like Tecumseh's could have on peer pressure.2 °0
Justice Breyer next addressed the privacy concerns related to drug
testing.20 1 First, he gave great weight to the fact that the school board
gave everyone an opportunity to participate and express their views,
and very little, if any, opposition was raised against instituting the
drug testing program. 20 2 Second, the Policy did not test the entire student population,203 and this effectively allowed a student to choose not
to participate in extracurricular activities: a less severe penalty than
expulsion.20 4 Third, the alternative of testing based upon suspicion
could lead to targeting and subsequent stigmatization of members of
unpopular groups.20 5 Although Justice Breyer allowed drug testing in
this case, his emphasis on the Policy's limitation to students in extracurricular activities suggests that he would not approve of a policy that
subjected all students to drug testing. Thus, Justice Breyer's vote will
likely be crucial in future cases.
3.

20 6
Justice Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion

Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion focused on the absence of
drug use and safety risks to students in extracurricular activities: "The
particular testing program upheld today is not reasonable, it is capricious, even perverse: [Tecumseh's] policy targets for testing a student
population least
likely to be at risk from illicit drugs and their damag'2 7
ing effects.
a.

The Common Characteristicsof Vernonia and Pottawatomie

With respect to the nature of the public school setting, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that schools certainly have an interest in the
health and safety of their students but noted that the risks of drug use
200. Id. at 839-41 (Breyer, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 841-42 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
204. Id. (Breyer, J.,concurring).
205. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 842 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion was
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
addition, Justice O'Connor wrote a brief dissenting opinion, with which Justice Souter
joined, reiterating her belief that Vernonia was wrongly decided. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
207. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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are present for all schoolchildren.2 18 "Vernonia cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all students upon any
evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life and
health of those who use them. ' 2 9 In Justice Ginsburg's view, the
Vernonia decision was limited to student athletes based upon their
drug use as a group and the enhanced dangers associated with their
participation in sports.2 1 °
With respect to the voluntary nature of the activities, Justice Ginsburg explored the reality that participation in extracurricular activities
is essential for college applications, as well as for enhancing the quality of the educational experience. 2 1' Students volunteer for extracurricular activities for the same reasons they volunteer for honors
classes.21 2 The distinction between athletics and extracurricular activities lies in the fact that schools have a duty to mitigate the physical
dangers associated with sports.2 1 3 Close regulation of athletics is
therefore required, but extracurricular activities do not involve any
similar physical risk. 4
b.

What Vernonia Really Means Here

Applying Vernonia's "fact-specific balancing "215 to Pottawatomie,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the suspicionless drug testing of students in extracurricular activities was unconstitutional. 16 When discussing the nature of the privacy interest-the first part of the
balancing test-the Vernonia Court emphasized the routine communal undress required of athletes in describing their reduced expectation of privacy: changing in the locker room, showering in the open,
and utilizing toilet facilities that have no stall doors.2 17 In Pottawatomie, participation in extracurricular activities had no equivalent to
such communal undress. 218 Justice Ginsburg insisted that sharing
sleeping quarters and using restrooms that do have stall doors when
traveling hardly compared to changing clothes and showering naked
in front of other students.2 1 9
Justice Ginsburg further noted that the Vernonia Court assumed
that all information pertaining to the drug test and prescription medi208. Id. at 844 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 845-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 830.
216. Id. at 855 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)).
218. Id. at 847-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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cation would remain confidential. 22 1 The Court found the character of
the intrusion negligible based on the manner in which the urine samples were obtained.2 2 1 In Pottawatomie, however, evidence was
presented to the district court that the personal information of Ms.
Earls, along with other students, was often left lying about unsealed,
within reach of anyone.22 2 Evidence was also presented that the test
results were given out to people who did not possess a "need to
know. ' 2 23 Thus, in Justice Ginsburg's analysis, the character of the
privacy intrusion in Pottawatomie was greater because the personal
information was carelessly handled and did not remain confidential.22 4
The final step in the analysis, in Justice Ginsburg's view, presented
the greatest divergence from Vernonia.225 In Vernonia, an alarming
drug epidemic existed among athletes; 226 in Pottawatomie, no drug
problem existed among students in extracurricular activities or even
among students in general.22 7 In Vernonia, the drug testing policy was
limited to athletes;22 8 in Pottawatomie, the drug testing policy indiscriminately applied to all students in extracurricular activities.2 2 9 In
Vernonia, athletes were subjected to enhanced physical risk by drug
use and the test specifically screened for drugs that posed a demonstrated risk; 230 in Pottawatomie, students in extracurricular
activities
231
were not subject to any level of special risks.
In these respects, Justice Ginsburg found Pottawatomie much more
analogous to Chandler,where the Court found the drug testing policy
unconstitutional for these very reasons.2 32 The drug testing program
in Chandler, as in Pottawatomie, was not enacted in response to a
known drug problem or some extreme danger, and the program tested
individuals who were not engaged in activities that posed high safety
risks.23 3 The Chandler Court concluded that the proposed need for
testing was "symbolic," rather than "special," in that the purpose be220. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660).
221. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658).
222. Id. (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting).
223. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Respondents, 2002 WL
243578 at *6, *24, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332)); Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch.
Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1293 (W.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir.
2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
224. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995).
227. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S at 849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650.
229. Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 851 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
230. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
231. Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 851 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
232. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 854 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319-22 (1997).
233. Pottawatomie,536 U.S. at 854 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chandler,520
U.S. at 319-22).
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hind the testing was to appear committed to the war on drugs. 2 3 4 Justice Ginsburg reached the same conclusion about the Policy in
Pottawatomie: the need was symbolic because the true purpose behind
the testing was to broadcast Tecumseh's stand against drug use.23 5
Justice Ginsburg's correct application of Vernonia's fact-specific test
focused on Tecumseh, not the nation; therefore, the absence of specific facts relating to drug use and safety risks in Pottawatomie precluded a finding that the Policy was reasonable.
IV.
A.

THE ROAD BEYOND POTTAWATOMIE:
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

No Drugs and No Risks: Problems with the Court's Analysis

Evidence of drug use and the safety-sensitive nature of the tasks
performed, or lack thereof, was crucial to the Court's decisions in
Vernonia, Skinner, Von Raab, and Chandler. In Vernonia, evidence of
drug use among athletes was high and the increased risk of physical
injury to athletes was also high.2 36 In Skinner, evidence of drug use
among railroad employees was low, but the increased risk of mass casualties from drug use was incredibly high.23 7 In Von Raab, evidence of
drug use among Customs employees was low, but the increased risk of
national security breaches from drug use was incredibly high.23 8
Vernonia, Skinner, and Von Raab each upheld random, suspicionless
testing.2 39 In Chandler, evidence of drug use was non-existent and
safety concerns were also non-existent, 24 0 thus drug testing was
disallowed.2 4 1
The Court's resolution of these cases seems to illustrate a spectrum
of reasonableness. If drug use is low but the danger to safety is high,
then drug testing is reasonable.2 42 If drug use is low and the danger to
safety is also low, then drug testing is unreasonable.2 4 3 In Pottawatomie, evidence of drug use and danger to safety were both minimal,24 4
so the drug testing program should have been found unreasonable.
234. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22).
235. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
236. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995).
237. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607-08 (1989).
238. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660,
664-65 (1989).
239. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
634.
240. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 311, 318-19 (1997).
241. Id. at 309.
242. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
634.
243. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-23.
244. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 849, 852 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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1. Vernonia vs. Pottawatomie: Opposite Ends of the Spectrum
a. The Absence of Drug Use
In Vernonia, the Court labeled the drug problem in the school district as "an immediate crisis" more severe than that in either Skinner
or Von Raab.24 5 The Court argued that, in Skinner, suspicionless testing of railroad employees was upheld "without proof that a [drug]
problem existed."2'4 6 In Skinner, however, the Federal Railroad Administration produced evidence of a significant number of train accidents involving alcohol or drug use that caused numerous fatalities
and injuries, as well as millions of dollars in damage.24 7 The Skinner
Court went on to stress that the results of drug use by employees
could result in "great human loss" and "disastrous consequences" with
even the smallest lapse in attention.2 48 The Court also likened railroad employees and the risks they engender to employees in nuclear
power plants.2 4 9 In Von Raab, the Court upheld suspicionless drug
testing of customs officials who carry firearms or are responsible for
intercepting drugs.2 5 ° The Court emphasized the "extraordinary
safety and national security hazards" present.
The Vernonia Court felt that the drug problem in the school warranted this "immediate crisis" designation because of the evidence of
the severity of the problem that was presented to the district court. 2
Teachers had observed a sharp increase in drug use that led to an increase in disciplinary problems in the schools:2 53 disciplinary referrals
had more than doubled in less than ten years254 and had reached "epidemic proportions. 2 5 5 The student athletes were the "leaders of the
drug culture, ' 256 and the staff directly observed the students using and
glamorizing drugs. 7 A large number of students258involved in interscholastic athletics were "in a state of rebellion.
In Pottawatomie, however, the district court acknowledged that
neither an epidemic drug problem nor a "state of rebellion" existed
among the students in Tecumseh. 25 9 The school district, in applica245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
1992),
256.
257.
258.
259.
(W.D.

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
Id.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607 (1989).
Id. at 628.
Id.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
Id. at 674.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662-63 (1995).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
Id. (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or.
rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated by 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
Id. (quoting Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).
Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287
Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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tions to the Department of Education in prior years, had stated that
drug use was not a major problem. 260 No teachers had observed students taking drugs; the choir teacher stated that most of her choir students did not use drugs, and the FHA teacher also stated that her
students involved in competition did not use drugs.2 61 The FFA
teacher reported "that students in FFA were less likely to use drugs
than students who were not so involved. 2' 6 2 The principal of Tecumseh High School reported that there had been no alcohol or drugrelated injuries or deaths while he had been at the school.2 6 3
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of a significant drug problem,
the Court substituted the "nationwide drug epidemic" to substantiate
the governmental interest.26 4 In addition, the Court mentioned several other instances in Tecumseh: marijuana found near the parking
lot and teachers' testimony that they had seen students who "appeared" to be on drugs.26 5 Unlike Vernonia, no evidence of the direct
observation of drug use among students was mentioned.2 6 6
Due to the lack of a documented drug problem, the Court used
Skinner and Von Raab to support the use of drug testing on a preventive basis.267 The Court failed to address adequately, however, the
obvious distinction between these cases and drug use by students in
extracurricular activities.2 68 The tests in Skinner and Von Raab were
"installed to avoid enormous risks to the lives and limbs of others, not
dominantly in response to the health risks to users invariably present
in any case of drug use."' 269 In the context of students in extracurricular activities, no national security concerns or risks of deadly train
wrecks were involved.2 70 In Chandler, a case decided two years after
Vernonia, the dissenting opinion of one lone Justice would have allowed drug testing on a purely preventive basis on the theory that it
260. Id. at 1287 n.23.
261. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1273
(10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
262. See id. at 1273.
263. Id. at 1272. The president of the school board provided the greatest amount of
evidence relating to a drug problem; many of the instances she described, however,
occurred in the 1970's and 1980's and were merely the stories of her children or comments she overheard. Id. at 1274 n.9. She mentioned over a dozen instances of drug
usage, but the only specific incident of suspected drug use of a student involved in
extracurricular activities occurred in 1999, when drug paraphernalia was found in the
car of an FFA student. Id. During the 1998-99 school year, 486 high school students
were drug tested, but only two students tested positive, both of whom were athletes.
Id. During the 1999-2000 school year, 311 high school students were tested, but only
one tested positive, again, an athlete. Id. at 1273.
264. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 834-35 (2002).
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 835.
268. See id. at 835-36.
269. Id. at 850 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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was unnecessary to wait for an actual drug problem to evidence itself.2 7 ' This logic was rejected, however, by the majority of the Court,
which continued to stress the need for evidence of an actual drug
problem.2 7 2 The Court's preference for evidence of a drug problem
seemed to dissolve in Pottawatomie.
b.

The Absence of Safety Risks

In Vernonia, the Court found that "the risk of immediate physical
harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is
particularly high."27' 3 The district court found that the school administrators were greatly concerned for the safety of student athletes because they were observed to be the most involved in the drug
culture. 274 At the trial, expert testimony verified the harmful effects
of drugs on coordination, reaction, memory, motivation, judgment,
and performance.275 The high school wrestling and football coach witnessed injuries to football players and a wrestler that he believed were
the result of drug use: safety omissions and misexecutions on the football field and a severe injury to a wrestler during competition.27 6 The
drugs that the district tested in Vernonia were drugs that posed physi2 77
cal risks to athletes.
2 78
In holding the drug testing policy unconstitutional in Chandler,
the Court stressed that in addition to the lack of a drug problem, the
"officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety sensitive tasks. '2 79
The Court noted that there was no indication whatsoever of a concrete danger sufficient to dispense with the requirement of individualized suspicion.2 80
In Pottawatomie, the Court simply stated that "the safety interest
furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children,
athletes and nonathletes alike. '28 1 The only particular risk even mentioned was the risk of overdose.28 2 According to the Tenth Circuit,
"[i]t is difficult to imagine how participants in vocal choir, or the academic team, or even the FHA are in physical danger if they compete
271. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 321-22.
273. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995).
274. Id. at 649.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 662. Amphetamines mask the body's normal response to fatigue and are
dangerous when used during exercise. Id. Marijuana alters blood pressure responses
and increases body temperature by inhibiting the body's ability to sweat. Id. Cocaine
causes a rise in blood pressure and possible heart malfunctions. See id.
278. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
279. Id. at 321.
280. See id. at 318-19.
281. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 836-37.
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in those activities while using drugs, any more than any student is at
risk simply from using drugs. '2 8 3 The only true exploration of drugassociated dangers to students in extracurricular
activities, or the lack
284
thereof, was made in the briefs to the Court.
In its brief, Tecumseh argued that safety risks exist for band members because they perform routines with heavy instruments and for
28 5
cheerleaders because they perform acrobatics and create pyramids.
In addition, FFA members work with large animals that they must
control and restrain. 28 6 Although Tecumseh admitted that activities
such as choir, FHA, and academic team do not pose any similar physical danger, Tecumseh argued that those activities pose a safety risk
due to the lack of supervision28 7 associated with travel to events.2 8 8
The Tenth Circuit found this argument unpersuasive, however, because other groups that travel on field trips and stay overnight face
the same supervision concerns but are not subject to drug testing.2 8 9
Justice Ginsburg positively poked fun at Tecumseh's efforts to
equate the dangers associated with extracurricular activities with the
dangers presented in the contexts of the Court's earlier cases: "Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-control flatware, livestock
run amok, and colliding tubas disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of students the School District seeks to test
in truth are engaged in activities that are not safety sensitive to an
unusual degree. ' 290 No student participating in band, choir, academic
team, or FHA ever suffered an injury as a result.2 9' Only one injury
of a student involved in an extracurricular activity was even mentioned.2 92 The evidence presented by Tecumseh failed to show the
existence of any significant safety concerns with respect to students in
extracurricular activities.29 3
283. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1277 (10th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (alteration in original).
284. See Brief of Petitioners at *4-8, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332), 2001 WL 1819195;
Brief of Respondents, 2002 WL 243578 at *2, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92
of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332).
285. Brief of Petitioners at *43, Pottawatomie (No. 01-332).

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *43-44.
289. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1277 (10th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
290. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 852 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291. Brief of Respondents, 2002 WL 243578 at *2, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332).
292. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1274 n.9. In 1990 or 1991, an FFA student lost control of a
steer, which injured the student and another person. Id. at 1272. The president of the
school board observed the incident and believed the student was "under the influence
of some substance." See id. at 1272, 1274 n.9.
293. See id. at 1277.
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The Ramifications of the Court's Leniency

School-Wide Testing: The Reality of the Future
Independent School District

Students in the Future Independent School District will likely challenge the expansive policy of drug testing all students. Yet applying
the analysis used in Pottawatomie,294 the program could easily be declared constitutional. "Special needs" exist in the public school setting, so the reasonableness balancing test would be applied: "a factspecific balancing of the intrusion on the children's Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. ' 29 5 Under Pottawatomie, all students have a diminished
expectation of privacy due to required vaccinations and examinations.
In addition, a school acts as guardian and tutor over the children
under its care.2 96 Under Pottawatomie,the character of the intrusion
for drug testing would be minimal because the urine would be collected in a manner like that of a public restroom and the results
mainly kept confidential. 9 7
On the other side of the scale, the importance of the government's
concern in preventing drug use by students would be "compelling."2 98
Under Pottawatomie, a demonstrated drug problem would be unnecessary because the nationwide drug epidemic makes drugs a primary
concern in every school. 299 Drug use poses the same risk of overdose
to all students: "the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children .... 300
As the above discussion indicates, the drug testing policy of the Future Independent School District could easily pass muster under the
Court's analysis in Pottawatomie. The remaining bastion of hope
against such wide expansion is Justice Breyer, whose concurring opinion stressed that the policy in Pottawatomie did not apply to all
students.3 ° a
If school districts are not required to show an identifiable drug
problem prior to instituting a testing program, then schools will be
free to test larger and larger segments of the population. 30 2 Indeed,
Deputy Solicitor General for the United States, Paul Clement, argued
before the Supreme Court that a school-wide drug testing program
294. See Pottawatomie,536 U.S. at 830-38.
295. See id. at 830.
296. Id.
297. See id. at 832-33.
298. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
299. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 834.
300. Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
301. See id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring). See supra Part III.C.2.
302. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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would be constitutional.30 3 Justice Scalia, during oral argument, also
seemed to push for the validity of extending drug testing to include all
children in public schools.3 °4
The legal and judicial leaders of this country seem to be leaning
towards further expansion of drug testing in schools.30 5 Tecumseh received so many requests regarding the implementation of its Policy
that the district posted it on the Internet, 30 6 and after the decision in
Vernonia, °7 schools throughout the country began implementing
some sort of drug testing policy for their students.30 8 In Lockney,
Texas, and Sundown, Texas, the school districts enacted a mandatory
3 9 If
drug testing policy for all junior and senior high school students.
a student or parent refuses, the student receives the same punishment
as that for an initial failure to pass the test: in-school suspension.3 10
Considering the expansion in drug testing that occurred after
Vernonia, one can only imagine the expansion that will occur, and is
already occurring, as a result of Pottawatomie.3 11 As Justice Ginsburg
stressed, the danger in replacing the fact-specific showing of a drug
problem with the nationwide drug problem is that all students become
fair game for drug testing.31 2 Absent the showing of a drug problem
among the students to be tested, where, if anywhere, is the line to be
drawn?
2.

Interference with Parental Rights

The Court first stated in Vernonia, and later reiterated in Pottawatomie that "when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant
question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and
tutor might undertake. ' 31 3 The Court did not, however, define "reasonable guardian and tutor., 31 4 Although the Court constantly em303. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 22, Pottawatomie (No. 01332), available at 2002 WL 485032.
304. See id. at 26, 40-41, 49.
305. See id. passim.
306. Tamar Lewin, With Court Nod, ParentsDebate School Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2002, at Al.
307. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
308. Lewin, supra note 306, at Al. Other school districts waited for the decision in
Pottawatomie and are now beginning to debate how broadly that decision can apply.
Id.
309. Jim Yardley, Family in Texas Challenges Mandatory School Drug Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at Al.
310. Id.
311. Lewin, supra note 306, at Al.
312. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 844 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 830 (emphasis added) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
314. See id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
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phasized the importance of the school acting in loco parentis,3 15 the
Court never intimated that parents relinquish their parental rights to
the school when their children walk in the front door. But the Court
approved of a policy that removes parental consent from the equation;
parents must consent to a drug test in order for their children to be
able to participate in extracurricular activities.3 16
Over a dozen parents and grandparents joined together to file an
amicus curiae brief to voice their opposition to the suspicionless drug
testing policy in Pottawatomie. 17 They opposed the Policy because "it
takes parenting away from the parents ...and it usurps parents' authority to make decisions about how their children are raised."3'18 The
fundamental nature of the right of a parent to raise a child has been
recognized by the Supreme Court for decades. 3 19 Other parents
across the country have objected to the drug testing policies of their
children's schools, as evidenced by the growing number of legal
cases.

320

Larry Tannahill, parent of a junior high student, filed suit against
the Lockney school district's mandatory drug testing policy because
he felt that it took away his rights as a parent: 32 1 "They cannot tell me
how I'm supposed to believe ... I believe in the Constitution. And
because I believe in our Constitution and our rights, you're going to
punish my son? I don't think so."' 322 What about parents who object
to mandatory testing?
Drug testing programs that allow for parental consent and participation provide one alternative. In Dade County, Florida, the school
district implemented a non-mandatory drug testing policy that requires parental consent and whose only consequence is notification to
315. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 830-31; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55. For a
discussion of in loco parentis, see DeMitchell, supra note 59.
316. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281,
1282-83 (W.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
317. Brief of Jean Burkett et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 1-2,
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002) (No. 01-332), available at 2002 WL 206374.
318. Id. at 2.
319. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding prohibition
on private schools was an unconstitutional interference with "the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding prohibition on teaching
of foreign languages was an unconstitutional interference with the right to "bring up
children").
320. See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1057 (7th Cir.
2000); Miller ex. rel. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1999); Todd v. Rush
County Schs., 133 F.3d 984, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1998); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez,
963 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Colo. 1998).
321. Yardley, supra note 309, at Al.
322. Id.
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the parent of the test's outcome. 323 A school program in Arkansas
makes "drug testing kits available to parents upon request. '324 This
allows for parents to choose if they want to test their children for
drugs, just as they are allowed to choose how to raise their children, in
general.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Supreme Court should return to the fact-specific test used in
Vernonia3 25 and allow only for drug testing those students among
whom there is a demonstrated drug problem and an increased risk of
injury. An important defense against needless and unjustified intrusion remains by requiring districts to demonstrate a drug problem.
Students would not be penalized simply because they desired to join
the choir or band.
Testing only those students who have a demonstrated drug problem
affects a balance between the rights of schools to guard against drug
use among students and the rights of parents to choose how to address
drug use with their children. Under Pottawatomie, parents are needlessly removed from the decision-making process. The Court has a
history of respecting the rights of parents to raise their children,3 26 and
the Court should honor this tradition.
In Pottawatomie, Justice Thomas stated that it would be impossible
to require a threshold amount of drug use before a testing program
could be implemented,32 7 and the Court allowed the nationwide drug
problem to supplant any such requirement.3 2 8 This reasoning is inconsistent, however, with the Court's decisions in other areas. For example, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 3 2 9 the Court held that
evidence of nationwide discrimination was insufficient to support an
affirmative action program in a particular locality.3 3 ° The Court's rigorous standard in Croson required proof of actual discrimination
against a specific group within a particular locality, among other crite323. See Mireya Navarro, Parents Support Florida School District's Offer of Drug
Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at A23.
324. Worried About Drugs? Have Parents Do the Testing, PRO PRINCIPAL, July
2002, at 3.
325. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
326. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding prohibition
on private schools was an unconstitutional interference with "the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding prohibition on teaching
of foreign languages was an unconstitutional interference with the right to "bring up
children").
327. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
328. See id. at 834.
329. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
330. See id. at 500, 504-05.
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ria.3 3 ' As Croson demonstrates, the Court does not always disapprove
of such threshold requirements and such a requirement should be imposed upon random, suspicionless drug testing of students.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Pottawatomie foreshadows approval of the all-encompassing drug testing program of the Future Independent School District. The Pottawatomie Court validated testing
students among whom there was no evidence of drug use and no increased risk of physical harm from participation in extracurricular activities.3 3 2 All students across America fit into such a broad category.
Without adequate safeguards against the expansion of drug testing
programs, suspicionless drug testing will likely spread rapidly.
The Supreme Court's rulings continue to erode Fourth Amendment
protections for students.33 3 If this erosion continues, the words of the
Fourth Amendment will lose their substance and a hollow shell of its
protections is all that will remain. In addition to this alarming trend of
eradicating students' rights, parents seem to have been ignored in the
rush to test larger segments of the student population. This exclusion
violates the rights of parents to choose how to address drug use with
their children.
The Supreme Court once wisely stated: "[The fact] [t]hat [schools]
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."3 3' 4 In order to
heed these great words, the Supreme Court should return to the factspecific test of Vernonia and close the door to the further expansion of
random, suspicionless drug testing in schools.
Emily Crockett
331. See id. at 509-11.
332. See Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 834-38.
333. For a discussion of the erosion of the Fourth Amendment in other areas, see
generally Kloster, supra note 12; Lehmann, supra note 12; Line, supra note 12.
334. Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 855 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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